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CRIMINAL LAW
THE CASE OF THE DISRUPTIVE DEFENDANT: ILLINOIS v. ALLEN
JOEL M. FLAUM* AND JAMES R. THOMPSONt
On August 12, 1956, William Allen entered a
Chicago tavern and, after ordering a drink, took
$200 from the bartender at gunpoint. He was
later arrested and identified by the bartender.
Allen was subsequently indicted, convicted of
armed robbery, and was sentenced to serve ten
to thirty years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.
Prior to his trial in 1957, at which the defense
was insanity, the defendant expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the public defender, and, after refusing
court-appointed counsel, did not retain private
counsel as he stated he would. Thereafter, Allen
was offered the choice of the public defender or an
attorney from the bar association defense com-
mittee. He refused both and requested the ap-
pointment of one from a list of attorneys he pre-
sented. The trial judge denied this request and
informed defendant that a lawyer from the bar
association would be appointed. Thereupon Allen
became adamant in his request that he be allowed
to represent himself despite the repeatedly ex-
pressed concern of the court about his ability to
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defend himself. The court finally acceded to Allen's
demand, but, in addition, appointed a bar asso-
ciation attorney to assist and advise the defendant.
During the voir dire examination of the first
prospective juror by the defendant-throughout
which Allen had asked many irrelevant questions
and indicated a lack of knowledge of the law and
procedure-the trial judge instructed Allen to
confine his questions solely to juror qualifications.
Thereafter, when the court suggested that
counsel take over the examination, Allen pro-
ceeded to argue with the judge in a ". . most
abusive and disrespectful manner." I Subsequently,
the defendant repeated his obstreperous conduct
and the judge admonished him by warning that
he would be permitted to remain present only if
he conducted himself properly.
The defendant continued to talk and terminated
his remarks by stating: "When I go out for lunch
time, you're [the judge] going to be a corpse here."
Allen then tore his attorney's file and threw the
papers on the floor. A second warning followed, but
Allen persisted in his unruly conduct and con-
temptuous remarks and threatened to disrupt the
trial. The court finally ordered the defendant
removed from the courtroom and directed the
appointed counsel to proceed in Allen's behalf.
After the selection of the jury the defendant
was invited to return and, although he refused to
offer a commitment of proper conduct, he was
allowed to remain in the courtroom.
Immediately upon commencement of the trial
the defendant provoked another clash with the
court and his second removal occurred. After this
exclusion he remained out of the court during the
presentation of the state's case in chief, except
when brought in for purposes of identification.
I United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d
232, 233 (7th Cir. 1969).
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During one of these latter appearances Allen
swore at the court while demanding his right to
be present at trial.
Before the beginning of the defense the trial
judge again offered Allen the opportunity to
remain in the courtroom. Despite only limited
assurances of proper conduct, Allen was permitted
to be present through the remainder of the trial.
Allen's conviction was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Illinois;2 and the Supreme Court of the
United States denied certiorari3 Allen's subse-
quent habeas corpus petition was denied.4 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
that judgment with one judge dissenting, con-
cluding that "A defendant in a criminal proceeding
has the unqualified right to be personally present
at all stages of his trial" and that "No conditions
may be imposed on [that] absolute right." 5
The Supreme Court of the United States, in an
opinion written by Mr. Justice Black, reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeals:
"[W]e explicitly hold today that a defendant
can lose his right to be present at trial if, after
he has been warned by the judge that he will be
removed if he continues his disruptive behavior,
he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in
a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespect-
ful of the Court that his trial cannot be carried on
with him in the courtroom",6
The confrontation clause of the sixth amend-
ment7 ensures the defendant the right to be present
through all stages of his trial. To understand the
pre-Allen scope and application of this guarantee,
however, it is necessary to understand the right
as it existed at common law, for:
"The right of confrontation did not originate
with the provision in the Sixth Amendment, but
2 37 Ill. 2d 167, 226 N.E. 2d 1 (1967).
3 389 U.S. 907 (1967).
' United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, May 24, 1968 (no reported opinion).
5 United States ex rel. Allen v. Illinois, 413 F.2d
232, 234, 235 (7th Cir. 1969) (2-1 Decision).
6 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).7 U.S. CONST., Amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impar-
tial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the ac-
cusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against
him: to have compulsory process for obtaining
Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense. (Emphasis added).
was a common-law right having recognized excep-
tions. The purpose of that provision... is to con-
tinue and preserve that right, and not to broaden
it or disturb the exceptions." 3
The genesis of the right is to be found in the
early common law requirement that no trial for
felony could be had in the absence of the defend-
ant. At that time, the rule was cast in jurisdic-
tional terms-the defendant's presence was neces-
sary to the case and could not be waived.9
The early rule was also described in terms of
recognizing interests of the state in the presence
of the accused at trial. Thus, an early commentator
on criminal procedure stated:
... subject to exceptions and qualifications,
... an indicted person must be present in court
whenever any essential thing is done against him.
The reasons are two; first, to enable the prosecut-
ing power to identify him, and to inflict on him
the pronounced punishment; secondly, to secure to
him full facilities for defense. The one reason is in
the interest of the State, the other, of the defend-
ant. And these differing reasons, we shall see, are
sometimes dissimilar in their effects upon a par-
ticular argument or question." 10
As the rule developed, exceptions came to be
recognized, both before and after the adoption of
the sixth amendment. Thus, defendant's right to
"confront" the witnesses against him did not bar
the admission of dying declarations,n documentary
evidence, 12 or the affidavits of witnesses whose
absence from the trial had been wrongly procured
by the defendant."
More importantly, whether or not the confronta-
tion clause guaranteed the right to physical
presence at trial, two trends in the decisional law
can be clearly noted.
First, the rule of presence lost its jurisdictional
character. Most courts began to hold that a
8 Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926).
1 Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 608-9, 115
S.E. 679, 681 (1923); State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800,
811 (1883). The rule was less strict as to misdemeanors.
E.g., People v. Beck, 305 Ill. 593, 599, 137 N.E. 454,
457 (1922); State v. Rabens, 79 S.C. 542, 549, 60 S.E.
442 445 (1908).
'oJ. BISHOP, NEW CaNm'AL PROcEDuRE 174
(4th ed. 1895). See also McCorkle v. State, 14 Ind. 39
(1859).
" State v. Betha, 241 S.C. 16, 23, 126 S.E. 2d 846,
849 (1962).
'2 Tucker v. People, 122 Ill. 583, 593, 13 N.E. 809,
812 (1887); People v. Jones, 24 Mich. 214, 225 (1872).
'3Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).
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defendant could waive his right to be present at
the trial of a felony case. 4 Waiver was found not
only in cases where a defendant simply refused to
participate further in the trial, and said so,15 but
also in those cases where it could be inferred from
his condut.'8
An extensive examination of the principle of
waiver was undertaken by the Supreme Court in-
Diaz v. United States,7 a case which was to gain
reaffirmation in Allen.I s In Diaz, a homicide case
tried in the Philippine Islands, the accused left
the court in the middle of trial and sent back a
message that he expressly consented to the con-
tinuation of the trial in his absence. After con-
viction, it was contended:
".. . not that he did not voluntarily waive his
right to be present, if he could waive it, but that it
could not be waived, and that the court was there-
fore without power to proceed in his absence." 19
The answer to this contention was to be deter-
mined by the meaning of a governing statute
securing "to the accused in all criminal prosecutions
'the right to be heard by himself and counsel"'
which, the Court said, was the "substantial
equivalent" of the sixth amendment.
21
In construing the scope of the confrontation
clause, the Diaz Court agreed with the great
weight of state and federal authority which had
held that:
".. . the prevailing rule has been, that if, after the
trial has begun in his presence, he [the defendant]
voluntarily absents himself, this does not nullify
what has been done or prevent the completion of
the trial, but, on the contrary, operates as a waiver
of his right to be present and leaves the court free
14Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455-58
(1912); Scruggs v. State, 131 Ark. 320, 325-26, 198
S.W. 694, 696 (1917); People v. Harris, 302 Il1. 590,
592-93, 135 N.E. 75, 76-77 (1922).
6fDiaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
16 Examples of conduct from which a waiver of the
right to confrontation could be inferred are where a
bailed defendant abandons the cause or a prisoner
escapes from custody during trial. See e.g., United
States v. Noble, 294 F. 689, 692 (D. Mont. 1923),
agf'd, Noble v. United States, 300 F. 689, 692 (9th Cir.
1924); Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446,
455-61 (1899); United States v. Loughery, 26 Fed.
Cas. 998 (No. 15, 631) (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1876); Sah-
linger v. People, 102 Ill. 241, 247 (1882).
"223 U.S. 442 (1912).
1 397 U.S. at 342.
1 Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 453 (1912).
20 Phillipine Act of July 1, 1902, 32 STAT. 691, c.
1369, §5.
21223 U.S. at 454-58.
to proceed with the trial in like manner and with
like effect as if he were present." 22
The Court felt that without the rule "there could
be no conviction of any defendant unless he
wished to be present at the time the verdict is
rendered".,3 If such activity were sanctioned, the
accused would be permitted to profit by his own
wrong.
24
Lastly, the Court found no bar to such a holding
despite earlier, and seemingly contrary, language
in Hopt v. Utah,2 and Lewis v. United States.'
8
In both of those cases, the Court noted, "the
accused was in custody, charged with a capital
offense, and was sentenced to death." In Hopt,
the Court construed a territorial statute which
declared that he "must be personally present."
The Diaz Court read the Hopt opinion as holding
that the defendant could not, therefore, waive
what was in effect a jurisdictional bar to the
continuation of a trial in the absence of the defend-
ant. The holding of Lewis, according to the Diaz
Court, was simply that error resulted when a
defendant was excluded during the time when
challenges were made to the seating of jurors and
the defendant had properly and timely objected to
proceeding in his absence.
7
2"Id. at 455. See e.g., United States v. Loughery,
26 Fed. Cas. 998 (No. 15,631) (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1876);
United States v. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. 773 (No. 14,923)
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1835); Barton v. State, 67 Ga. 653
(1818); Sahlinger v. People, 102 Il. 241 (1881); Hill
v. State, 17 Wis. 675 (1864).
23 223 U.S. at 456, quoting with approval from Bar-
ton v. State, 67 Ga. 653 (1881).
'4223 U.S. at 458, quoting from Falk v. United
States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 460 (1899):
"Neither in criminal nor in civil cases will the law
allow a person to take advantage of his wrong
... yet this would be precisely what it would do if
it permitted an escape from prison,'or an abscond-
ing from the jurisdiction while at large on bail,
during the pendency of a trial before a jury, to
operate as a shield."
25110 U.S. 574 (1884).
28146 U.S. 370 (1892).
"223 U.S. at 458. The force of the Hopt and Lewis
holdings had been further diminished by Mr. Justice
Cardozo, writing for the court in Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), who said that:
"Hopt v. Utah... has been distinguished and
limited" [and] "What was said in Hopt v. Utah
... on the subject of the presence of a defendant
was dictum, and no more... We may say the same
of Lewis v. United States ... with the added obser-
vation that it deals with the rule at common law
and not with constitutional restraints."
The failure to recognize the defects of Hopi and Lewis
led the Seventh Circuit into error in voiding Allen's
conviction. 413 F.2d 232 (1969). The Court reversed
the district court's refusal to grant a writ of habeas
19701
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Any further doubt as to the authoritative value
of the Hopt and Lewis decisions, subject to their
interpretation in Diaz, was laid to rest by Allen:
"the broad dicta in Hopt v. Utah ... and Lewis
v. United States ... that a trial can never
continue in the defendant's absence has been
expressly rejected [by] Diaz v. United States... .,,2
The pre-Allen historical perspective of con-
frontation insofar as that right is guaranteed by
the sixth amendment 29 or as it existed at common
law, both before and after the amendment's adop-
tion, indicates, therefore, that: (1) the presence of
a defendant was once a jurisdictional requisite to
the trial of all felony cases; (2) this strict rule is now
followed only in capital cases;30 (3) a defendant
could waive, by word or deed, his right to be pres-
ent in all other felony cases; and (4) such waiver
could be expressed or implied."
The principle directly at issue in Allen was
whether a defendant in a noncapital felony case
could lose his right to be present during portions
of his trial when his contumacious conduct com-
pelled the trial judge to expel him in order to
facilitate the orderly proceeding of the trial.
When the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed
.Allen's conviction on direct appeal, it did so on
the basis of its prior opinion in People v. De
Simone." The De Simone opinion, upholding the
exclusion of a contumacious defendant, relied
upon past Illinois cases which, although clearly
consistent with the past decisions of the Supreme
Court," dealt only with the voluntary absence of
a defendant.
Following the filing of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the federal district court, the
case was collaterally examined. Since there ap-
corpus "in light of" these decision and that of Shields
v. United States, 273 U.S. 583 (1927). Shields merely
held that "the rule of orderly conduct of jury trial"
entitles a defendant to be present when additional
instructions are given to the jury. The sixth amend-
ment was in no way involved, or even discussed, in
Shields and the court cited only a civil case in support
of its holding. See 273 U.S. at 588-89.
"397 U.S. at 342.
2The sixth amendment is enforcible against the
states through the vehicle of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965).
80 But see People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill. 2d 522, 138 N.E.
2d 556 (1956).
3 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934).
9 Ill. 2d 522, 138 N.E. 2d 556 (1956).
"For example, Sahlinger v. People, 102 Ill. 241
(1882), upon which the DeSimone court relied (9 Ill.
2d at 533), was cited with approval by the Supreme
Court in Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455
(1912).
peared to be no direct precedent, the majority of
the appellate court, as well as the dissenting
judge reached their decisions on the bases of
reason and analogy."
However, long recognized and respected prece-
dent did exist. From early days, and without
dissent, the right of a defendant to be present at
all stages of his trial was qualified by the exception
that such right was lost when the courtroom
behavior of the defendant was so disturbing as to
compel his removal and the continuation of the
trial in his absence.
This qualification was first recognized by the
famous English authority on criminal law, Sir
James Fitzjames Stephen, who said:
"If a prisoner so misconducts himself as to make
it impossible to try him with decency, the Court,
it seems, may order him to be removed and proceed
in his absence." 5
This view was constantly reiterated by both
the English and American commentators who
unanimously recognized such a power in the trial
court.3
-"The precedents of People v. Allen, 37 III. 2d 167,
226 N.E. 2d 1 (1967) and People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill. 2d
522, 138 N.E. 2d 556 (19561 aside. However, Circuit
Judge Hastings, dissenting, agreed with the disposition
of Allen by the Illinois Supreme Court. 413 F.2d at 236.
" J. STEPENS, DIGEST OF Tim LAw OF CRnNAL
PiocEnuRE, Art. 302 (1883).
3See e.g., W. CLARK, CRIMNAL PROCEDuRE 495
(Mikell ed. 1918):
In cases where the defendant may waive his right
to be present, if his conduct is such that it is neces-
sary to remove him temporarily from the court-
room, such temporary absence will not affect the
validity of the trial. •
J. ARCHIBALD, CRI.NAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND
PRACTICE 179 (28th ed. 1931):
No trial for felony may be had except in the
presence of the defendant, and he must, it is said,
stand in the dock to be tried.... If he creates a
disturbance it is said that the trial may go on
without his presence.
S. HAIUs AND A. WrsHna-, CanuNAL LAW 396
(14th ed. 1933):
In cases of felony the prisoner must be in the dock
during the whole of the trial unless he is so violent
as to render a trial in his presence impossible.
1 J. BisHoP, NEw CmxmAL PRoc-nuRE 179 (4th ed.
1895):
Disorderly conduct of the prisoner at the trial,
such in degree that it cannot go on, has been held
to justify the court in removing him, and proceed-
ing in his absence.
D. FELruAN, DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS UNDER ENGLISH
LAw 68 (1966):
It is perfectly clear that the accused has a right
to be present in court throughout his trial although
there is some authority for the proposition that
the defendant may be excluded from the court-
[Vol. 61
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Moreover, there were English and American
cases which were precisely on point and which
were unanimous in upholding the power of a trial
court to expel an unruly defendant if his conduct
precluded the possibility of an orderly trial.
The principle was apparently first propounded
in a reported case in United States v. Davis. In
Davis, the defendant, a prisoner in custody, had
been indicted for perjury and, after selection of the
jury, repeatedly interrupted the opening statement
of the district attorney despite admonitions from
the court. When he persisted in such conduct, he
was ordered removed from the courtroom over the
objection of counsel and the trial resumed. On the
next day, "the defendant having become com-
posed", the case concluded. On a motion for a new
trial the defendant urged his involuntary removal
from the courtroom as error. In denying the motion,
the District Judge held:
"This statement [of the facts] seems sufficient
to dispose of the point in question. The right of a
prisoner to be present at his trial does not include
the right to prevent a trial by unseemly disturb-
ance. The defendant had the opportunity to be
present at the whole of his trial. He was, in fact,
present while the jury were being empanelled and
the evidence was being introduced. He was absent
during a part of the opening, only because of his
own disorderly conduct. It does not lie in his mouth
to complain of the order which was made necessary
by his own misconduct, and which he could at any
time have terminated by signifying his willingness
to avoid creating disturbance." 33
The question was next raised in Regina v.
Berry", an English case, where the court removed
a defendant, on trial for burglary, who tore off
his clothing, struggled with the wardens, and
room, and the trial may go on without him, if he
persistently creates disturbances and disrupts the
trial.
See also E. BowEN-RorANDs, CRIn.,AL PROCEEDINGS
ON INDICT ENT AND IFoRmATIoN (2nd ed. 1910);
Murray, The Power to Expel a Criminal Defendant from
His Own Trial; A Comparative View, 36 U. CoLO. L.
REv. 171 (1964). The only contrary suggestion is
found in L. OQRr-r, CannNAL P.ROcEDuRE FRom
ARREsT To ArREAL 414 (1947):
[P]ossibly the better course, even in such a case, is
to put the defendant under whatever restraint is
necessary to allow the trial to continue.
Orfield, however, noted that the precedent of expulsion
was also recognized.
3125 Fed. Cas. 773 (No. 14,923) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1869).
38 Id. at 774.
n 104 L.TJ. 110 (Northhampton Assizes 1897).
uttered 'loud cries, which, so far as they were
understood, were totally irrelevant to the charge."
In Rex v. Browne4 the defendant, accused of
obtaining property by false pretenses, screamed
and shouted in the dock after being warned that
the trial would proceed in her absence if she
persisted. She did persist, was removed from the
courtroom and the trial continued. The trial judge
held that there was "quite sufficient authority for
this course," relying upon the authority of Regina
v. Berry and an earlier unreported case before
Lord Blackburn on the Western Circuit.
Although all of the reported case authority was
decided by trial courts, two propositions added
weight to their force as precedent. First, there
were no contrary cases on point. No court, trial
or appellate, had ever held the involuntary expul-
sion of an unruly defendant to be error, constitu-
tional or otherwise. Secondly, the validity of the
case authority and the views of the commentators
had been explicitly sanctioned by the Supreme
Court. In Diaz v. United States,4' the Court ap-
provingly cited Davis v. United Statesa2 for the
proposition that if a defendant "voluntarily ab-
sents himself, this... operates as a waiver of his
right to be present and leaves the court free-to
proceed ..... 4 Since the principle of voluntary
absence was neither involved nor discussed in
Davis, the Diaz Court must have concluded that
involuntary absence for contumacious conduct was
the equivalent of voluntary absence insofar as the
reach of the sixth amendment was concerned.
44
The validity of this reasoning was substantiated
by Mr. justice Cardozo, writing for the Court in
Snyder v. Massachusetts.45 Prefacing his discussion
of whether a jury view of the scene of the crime
in the absence of the defendant, and over his
objection, violated the confrontation clause,
justice Cardozo declared that although the right
of confrontation was guaranteed by both the
federal and state constitutions, there was "no
doubt the privilege may be lost by consent or at
times even by misconduct." 41 The exactitude of Mr.
justice Cardozo's analysis was totally accepted in
40 70 J.P. 472 (London Cent. Crim. Ct. 1906).
41223 U.S. 442 (1912).
4 25 Fed. Cas. 773 (1835).
43 223 U.S. at 455-56.
44 This, of course, was precisely the reasoning and
holding of People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill. 2d 522, 533, 138
N.E. 2d 556 (1956), the precursor of Allen. See text
accompanying note 32 supra.
45 291 U.S. 97 (1934).46Id. at 106 (emphasis added).
1970]
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Allen when the Court specifically endorsed and
incorporated this very statement into its opinion.07
The legal effect of exclusion for misconduct was an
"imputed waiver" of the sixth amendment right to
be present throughout the trial. 8
Hence, throughout the course of Anglo-Ameri-
can criminal jurisprudence, case law and com-
mentators alike have held that neither the sixth
amendment nor the common law precluded the
involuntary removal of a defendant who, by his
conduct in the courtroom, asserted a right to
destroy the orderly pursuit of justice. However,
not until Allen did the issue come squarely before
the Supreme Court.
Simply stated, the Supreme Court held in Allen:
"... that a defendant can lose his right to be pres-
ent at trial, if after he has been warned by the
judge that he will be removed if he continues his
disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on
conducting himself in a manner so disorderly,
disruptive and disrespectful of the court that his
trial cannot be carried on with him in the court-
room." 49
At the same time, in dicta, the Court upheld the
constitutional validity of other methods of dealing
with the unruly defendant, namely, contempt and
shackling. 0
Recent experience suggests that the number of
criminal defendants who for one reason or another
engage in disruptive conduct may be on the
increase.51 Allen has now invested state and federal
trial judges with extraordinary power to deal
with contumacy in the courtroom. However,
though wide-ranging as to the available sanctions,
the opinion does not speak to some of the prob-
lems that will arise in the employment of such
sanctions. These problems and their possible
solutions, therefore, will constitute the final thrust
of this commentary.
Allen sanctions at least four possible techniques
which may be used by trial judges to end disrup-
tion by the defendant: (1) criminal contempt; (2)
recess of the trial with the defendant remanded
47 397 U.S. at 342.48 See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455-56;
J. STEPEMNS, DIGEsT OF ThE LAw Or CRn NAL
PiocEDuRE Art. 302 (1883).
49 397 U.S. at 343.
10 Id. at 343-44.
"I It is fair to assume that the Court was not unaware
of such occurrences and sought to deal with them as
quickly and firmly as possible. Both briefs and oral
argument were advanced and the opinion was delivered
only five weeks after argument.
to custody; (3) binding and gagging, and (4) ex-
pulsion. 2
One is tempted to assume that these measures
may be placed across a scale--that they express a
definitive range of sanctions which escalate to
match the nature and degree of the defendant's
conduct. If it could be said with some assurance,
for example, that mildly disruptive conduct would
warrant only the imposition of a contempt sen-
tence, while the most outrageous conduct auto-
matically brought expulsion, the task of trial
judges in the application of Allen standards would
not be difficult. Alternatively, the approved sanc-
tions could be regarded as equal in force and left
to the discretion of the court.
The resolution of these conflicting theories is
somewhat difficult. Clearly, the opinion was meant
to provide maximum power to trial judges with
the authority to impose it in the broadest exercise
of discretion. Explicit care was taken, in a case
which involved only expulsion, to define all other
sanctions available. One reason for this, of course,
was simply to present all possible and acceptable
solutions. The other, arguably, was to head off
claims from other litigants, in past or pending
cases, that expulsion was the only proper remedy
when they had already been cited for contempt or
bound and gagged.
As a result, the Court's technique of opting for
a "neutral" description of alternatives prevents
any assured conclusion that the penalties range
from mild to severe. For example, in approving
the use of contempt sentences, the Court said:
"... citing or threatening to cite a contumacious
defendant for criminal contempt might in itself be
sufficient to make a defendant stop interrupting a
trial ... the contempt remedy should be borne in
mind by a judge in the circumstances of this
case." 63
Speaking to the use of coercive contempt while
recessing the trial, the Court said, "[This pro-
cedure is consistent with the defendant's right to
be present at trial, and yet it avoids the serious
shortcomings of the use of shackles and gags." 54
The Court warned, however, that where a defend-
ant might strategically elect to delay the trial,
even though it meant confinement in the mean-
time, a trial judge "must guard against allowing
12397 U.S. at 343-46.




a defendant to profit from his own wrong in this
way." s
As for binding and gagging, the Court concluded
its discussion of the "serious shortcomings" with
the open-ended observation that "... . in some
situations which we need not attempt to foresee,
binding and gagging might possibly be the fairest
and most reasonable way to handle a defendait
who acts as Allen did here." 56
Finally, the Court held that as to expulsion,
"we find nothing unconstitutional about this
procedure. Allen's behavior was dearly of such an
extreme and aggravated nature as to justify either
his removal from the courtroom or his total
physical restraint." 57
At least some tentative conclusions may be
safely drawn from these dicta.
First, there is no requirement that a trial judge
threaten to cite, or actually cite, for contempt
before imposing the sanctions of shackles and gag
or expulsion. If such a requirement existed, the
trial court's decision in Allen would have been
overturned since the threat of contempt pro-
ceedings was never voiced by the judge from the
beginning of the contretemps to the moment of
expulsion. Judge Niemeyer first warned Allen that
he would lose the right to defend himself if he
persisted in voir dire questions beyond the bounds
of propriety. Immediately thereafter the judge
invoked the possibility of exclusion upon further
disruption. Therefore, the Court's injunction to
trial judges that the contempt remedy should be
"borne in mind" means just that and no more.
Secondly, Allen must be read as upholding the
right of a trial judge to expel an unruly defendant
in the circumstances of all past cases where
shackling and gagging has been employed.8 An
examination of earlier cases where convictions
were upheld despite the use of shackles has dis-
closed none where a defendant's conduct was less
aggravated than that of Allen. Since the Court
would have upheld shackling in Allen, it follows
that the circumstances of prior binding and
gagging cases may be safely used as precedent for
expulsion in future trials.
Thirdly, despite the Court's willingness to
endorse the use of shackling under the Allen
5 .Id.
161d. at 344.
7 Id. at 346 (emphasis added).
5E.g., Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911 (9th
Cif. 1968), cerl. denied, 393 U.S. 867 (1969); Dennis v.
Dees, 278 F. Supp. 354 (D.C. La. 1968).
facts, and its assumption that under circumstances
"which we need not attempt to foresee, binding
and gagging might possibly be the fairest and
most reasonable way," 59 binding and gagging will,
inevitably decline in use as a remedy to end
disruption and its passing from the judicial scene
will not be moirned.
There are several reasons justifying this conclu-
sion. The majority and concurring opinions in
Allen appear to be a signal to trial courts that
binding and gagging is the least preferable remedy.
Mr. Justice Black's majority opinion says so
directly, 0 and Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion agrees.6' Furthermore, it is difficult to
conceive of a situation where binding and gagging
would be "the fairest and most reasonable way"
to the exclusion of contempt or expulsion. More-
over, recent experience demonstrates that binding,
even to the point of immobility, and gagging will
not necessarily end the disruption.1 Certainly it
will not end the distraction of the jury from the
issue of guilt or innocence.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, expul-
sion quickly ends disruption and distraction and,
because of its consequences, promises to bring the
most recalcitrant defendant into adherence with
proper standards of conduct in the shortest pos-
sible time. Doubtless, too, a sanction which is the
easiest to administer and is, at the same time the
most effective, will be adopted more often by most
judges faced with the problem of the unruly
defendant. This is, of course, as it should be.
The Allen holding is firmly and specifically
structured upon the requirement that expulsion
may not be employed as a sanction unless it is
preceded by warnings which direct the attention
of the defendant to his conduct and to the con-
sequences of any continued disruption and defiance.
Thus, the Court said:
"... we explicitly hold today that a defendant can
lose his right to be present at trial if... he as been
59 397 U.S. at 344.
60 ,,... no person should be tried while shackled and
gagged except as a last resort." 397 U.S. at 344.
1 ".. .I also agree with the Court that these three
methods are not equally acceptable. In particular,
shackling and gagging is surely the least of them."
397 U.S. at 350 (Brennan, J., concurring).6 In the "Chicago Conspiracy Eight," later "Con-
spiracy Seven"trial, United States v. Dellinger No. 69-
CR-180 (N.D. Ill. 1970), defendant Bobby Seale had to
be severed from the trial because, while bound, he
could still move his chair and, while gagged, he could,
and did, whimper and moan through the gags and the
reinforcing hands of a Deputy United States Marshal.
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warned by the judge that he will be removed if he con-
tinues his disruptive behavior... . ""
This requirement was reemphasized by Mr.
Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion:
"Of course, no action against an unruly defendant
is permissible except after he has been fully and
fairly informed that his conduct is wrong and in-
tolerable, and warned of the possible consequences
of continued misbehavior." "
Accordingly, standards by which to judge the
efficacy of the warning must be created. The
warning should meet at least an eightfold require-
ment:
(1) Following disruptive behavior which, if
continued, would justify expulsion or be-
havior which, while perhaps not alone
justifying expulsion, is combined with the
expressed intention of the defendant to en-
gage in future conduct that is more severe,
the trial court must
(2) warn the defendant that his conduct, or
expressed intentions, are
(3) wrong and violate the dignity and respect
for judicial proceedings which must be en-
forced;
(4) will not be tolerated during the course of
the trial, and that
(5) future occurrences of a like nature will result
in expulsion from the trial for as long as his
disruptive posture is maintained, that
(6) the trial will continue in his absence, that
(7) he will lose his right to see and hear the
witnesses testify and the evidence intro-
duced, and will lose his right to observe all
other proceedings of the trial, and that
(8) he will not be readmitted to the courtroom
until he indicates expressly, and for the
record, that he will cease disruption.
397 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added). Prior to his
removal Allen was repeatedly warned by the trial
judge that he would be removed from the courtroom
if his disruptive conduct persisted.
4Id. at 350 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). The Brennan dictum can be broadly read to
require a warning before any sanction, including con-
tempt and binding and gagging, may be employed.
There is an obvious difference between the kind of
"warning" which may be required before a finding of
contempt is entered and that which is required before
a "sanction" forfeiting the right of trial presence is
employed. The former is more nearly akin to a sub-
stantive criminal offense and the promulgation and
publication of the contempt statute will serve as the
"warning." It is clear, however, that, at least as to ex-
pulsion, the warning is required.
The trial court should, of course, punctuate each
warning with questions to make sure that the
defendant understands the meaning of the court's
remarks.
This approach is one with which trial judges are
already familiar because it has long been required
in analogous contexts such as the waiver of a
jury trial, 8 the taking of a guilty plea, 66 and the
waiver of the right to counsel. 7 The language
implemented by trial judges may vary; there
should be no fixed formula. The essential point is
that the warning follow intolerable conduct, that
it direct the attention of the defendant to the
existence of his conduct, that it indicate the wrong-
fulness of the conduct, and that it inform the
defendant of the court's intention to expel him for
repeated misbehavior and of the consequences of
such expulsion. When this is accomplished, the
court need only assure that the record reflects the
warning and the defendant's response before em-
ploying the sanction upon further violation.
Once the remedy of expulsion has been em-
ployed, the question as to how, and under what
circumstances, the expelled defendant may regain
his right to be present at trial arises. The majority
opinion in Allen sets forth a guide:
"Once lost, the right to be present can, of course,
be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to
conduct himself consistently with the decorum of
courts and judicial proceedings." "8
The opinion does not settle the matter of
whether the burden of inquiry concerning the
future conduct of the expelled defendant lies with
him or with the court. Thus, a problem arises as
to who has the duty to initiate the process by
which the defendant re-enters the courtroom on a
promise of future adherence to the "decorum and
respect" of the proceedings.
65 The defendant must be warned of his right to a
jury trial and that his waiver will permit the judge,
siting alone, to decide his guilt. E.g., Boles v. Steven-
son, 379 U.S. 43 (1964); Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276 (1930); People v. Lyons, 250 N.E.2d 133,
42 Ill. 2d 431 (1969).
66 The defendant must be told that a plea of guilty
waives all necessity for trial, for the presentation of
evidence, and he must be informed of the sentence
that will be imposed. E.g., McCarthy v. United States,
394 U.S. 459 (1969).
67 The defendant must be told that he has a right to
counsel, either appointed or retained, and that he will
be obliged to defend himself without other assistance
if he waives counsel. E.g., Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 605 (1943) Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
"397 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added).
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It might be argued that the duty lies with the
defendant to petition the court for readmittance
and that, failing such an initiative on his part,
there is no duty on the part of the trial judge, for
the balance of the trial, to inquire whether the
expelled defendant is ready to return. Such a rule
may he implied from the language that the accused
can "reclaim" the right.
On the other hand, the language of "reclaim,"
read less literally in the context of the A 1len facts,
may have no guiding significance. In Allen, the
trial judge recalled the defendant to the courtroom
on three occasions after his initial expulsion and
sought to obtain a pledge of proper behavior if he
was allowed to return. Not until the third ap-
pearance did Allen respond to thiese inquiries and
thereafter remain within the bounds of decorum.
"Allen," said the Court, "was constantly informed
that he could return to the trial when he would
agree to conduct himself in an orderly manner.
Ureer these drcumstances we hold that Allen lost
his right guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
amendments to be present throughout his trial." 69
Even in the absence of a dear signal in the
opinion, however, the proper rule demands that
the burden of inquiry, the duty of initiating the
process leading to return, rests with the court and
remains a continuing burden.
This burden should remain with the trial judge
because the remedy of expulsion is a drastic
measure involving significant consequences for the
defendant. Although the Court did not shrink
from a forthright holding that this sanction could
be employed, even under circumstances less com-
pelling than in previous cases where the only
sanctions ever suggested were restraint and con-
tempt, 0 and although both the majority and con-
curring opinions expressed greater repugnance for
the use of shackles as a remedy under any cir-
cumstances,n approval of expulsion did not come
easilyY
69 Id. at 346 (emphasis added).70 Compare, United States v. Bentevna, 319 F.2d
16 (2nd Cir. 1963).
" "But even to contemplate such a technique,
much less see it, arouses a feeling that no person
should be tried while shackled and gagged except
as a last resort."
397 U.S. at 344.
'However, I also agree with the court that these
three measures are not equally acceptable. In par-
ticular, shackling and gagging a defendant is surely
the least of them. It offends not only judicial dig-
nity and decorum, but also that respect for the
individual that is the lifeblood of the law."
Id. at 355-56 (Brennan, J., concurring).
""It is not pleasant to hold that respondent Allen
The burden of inquiry, moreover, is more easily
assumed by the trial court because the custody
and movements of the jailed or bailed defendant
are subject to the court's control. As a practical
matter, it is easier for the trial judge to order that the
jailed defendant be brought before him than it is for
the defendant to send word to the court, through
counsel or court attaches, requesting the oppor-
tunity to appear and "reclaim" his lost right. Such
a procedure will also ensure that the right to again
be present is not lost through a misunderstanding
of the order of expulsion, its duration or effect.
Such misunderstanding is, of course, conceivable
-even given a proper warning and continued
defiance which would justify expulsion as an
original matter.
Finally, the burden ought to be regarded as a
continuing one. Contumacy may die by degrees.
A defendant, such as Allen, may be defiant at the
beginning of the trial and repentant only after
repeated inquiries and continuing expulsion.
Whether this serves his own ends, strategic or
otherwise, is, of course, irrelevant. Then, too, the
relative importance of the defendant's presence
may increase as the trial progresses. Not only is
it harder to recapture each day lost, despite the
assistance of such aids as may be provided to
keep him, "apprised of the progress of his trial,"7
but as the case shifts from the prosecution to the
defense, the defendant's presence may then be
more aptly characterized as critical rather than
useful.
The choice of remedy may also be affected if
the case is one which involves multiple defendants.
In this situation, the expulsion of the unruly
defendant may be compelled under factual cir-
cumstances where, if the trial involved but a single
defendant, binding and gagging would suffice. The
reason is dear. If the right of presence is not
absolute, and the court may weigh the disad-
vantages of expulsion against the evil of disruption,
then the formula may rightly be expanded to
include the likelihood of prejudice which might
flow to the cause of co-defendants forced to pro-
ceed through trial on the same side of the table as
one who has defied the court and its processes
(including a jury), and whose continued presence
is a mute, but nonetheless compelling, reminder of
was properly banished from the court for a part of
his own trial." 397 U.S. at 346; "Deplorable as it is to
remove a man from his own trial, even for a short
time.. ." Id. at 347. Thus, expulsion was sanctioned
only through the employment of painstaking language.
7397 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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that defiance. Since the law attempts to shield
defendants from prejudice arising from the actions
or trial postures of co-defendants in a variety of
related circumstances/ 4 the likelihood of prejudice
to co-defendants arising from the disruption of one
defendant should be taken into account in con-
sidering the interests involved in a choice of
sanctionsY?
Once the sanction of expulsion has been im-
posed, there remains a problem as to the require-
ment of keeping the defendant apprised of the
progress of his trial.Y The idea that such a require-
ment would be desirable, let alone that it exists, is
not discussed in the Court's opinion, but is sug-
gested in the concurrence of Mr. Justice Brennan:
"I would add only that when a defendant is ex-
cluded 'from his trial, the court should make
reasonable efforts to enable him to communicate
with his attorney and, if possible, to keep apprised
of the progress of his trial. Once the court has re-
moved the contumacious defendant, it is not
weakness to mitigate the disadvantages of his
expulsion as far as technologically possible in the
circumstances." 7
74 The threat of prejudice arising from the introduc-
tion, in a joint trial, of evidence admissible only as to
a single defendant may warrant a severance, United
States v. Bruton, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); a severance
may be required where one co-defendant wishes to call
the other as a witness, United States v. Echeles, 352
F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965); defendants with antagonistic
defenses resulting in prejudice are entitled to a sever-
ance, first discussed by Justice Story in United States
v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480 (1827).
75 There are, of course, cases where claims of preju-
dice resulting from the misbehavior of co-defendants
have been held not to warrant a severance or reversal.
Brown v. United States, 375 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (co-defendant claiming insanity "threw a fit"
in court); United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698 (7th
Cir. 1966) (antagonistic personality of co-defendant);
United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2nd Cir.
1963) (co-defendants disrupted trial and were bound
and gagged); McDondald v. United States, 89 F.2d
128 (8th Cir. 1937) (co-defendant handcuffed). Though
these holdings may well be correct in the context of
the relief requested, nothing in their rationale would
preclude a court from taking into account the possi-
bility of prejudice arising from the retention in court
of a bound and gagged co-defendent as one factor in
deciding whether to employ the sanction of expulsion.
76 This issue is not the same as the topic much de-
bated by the court and counsel during the Allen oral
argument. That discussion revolved around the
employment of technological devices such as a sound-
proof booth and closed circuit television or radio as a
substitute for, or alternative to, incommunicado expul-
sion. Concern for retaining some benefits of the right
to be present, however, runs tbrough both concepts.
7 397 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., concurring). This
concluding reference to "weakness" is undoubtedly a
response to the oral argument of counsel for the State
of Illinois that the sixth amendment right to be present
Some accommodation should therefore be made
to ameliorate the condition of ignorance attaching
to the defendant after expulsion. To do so does not
imply "weakness" on the part of the trial judge.
How best to accomplish this goal presents another
question.
At the minimum, the schedule of the trial ought
to be adjusted so that defendant's counsel has
greater opportunity to confer with his client during
its course. Since the burden upon the lawyer to
recapitulate and translate the day's proceedings
for the absent defendant is greater than that
normally imposed upon the lawyer with a client
at his side, additional time ought to be allotted to
the traditional periods of recess and adjournment.
This procedure will serve two ends. It will
enable the absent defendant to retain some of the
benefits derived from the right of presence at trial
and, at the same time, afford an opportunity for
the defense attorney to counsel with his client
with a view to ending the disruption and returning
to the courtroom.Y
There remains the possibility that "technological
aids" may also be employed in assistance to the
absent defendant. It is clear, however, that the
Brennan opinion suggests a lighter burden in this
regard. As to counsel, the requirement was to
"make reasonable efforts to enable him to com-
municate with his attorney." 71 Regarding the
possible devices for keeping a defendant apprised
of the trial, the suggestion was to "make reasonable
efforts to enable him ... if possible to keep ap-
prised of the progress of his trial [and] ... to
mitigate the disadvantages of his expulsion as far
as technologically possible in the circumstances." 80
Several procedures may be suggested. Providing
at trial was not so absolute that the forms of judicial
administration had to be bent to the extremes of
installing glass booths or closed circuit television sys-
tems merely to preserve the appearance of the right
for one who insisted on abusing it through disruptive
conduct while present.
78 It would be better practice for the trial judge to
inquire of defense counsel, after such consultations at
recess and adjournment, whether he has discussed
with the defendant his current attitude toward adher-
ence to order and decorum in the courtroom and his
wish, if any, to return. This inquiry should be under-
taken, of course, in addition to the previously sug-
gested practice of calling the defendant personally into
the courtroom at regular intervals for the same inquiry.
79397 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., concurring). This
phrase should be read to mean in addition to the op-
portunity normally commanded by the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel afforded to every defendent in
custody.




the absent defendant with "daily copy" of the
transcript is a possibility. The cost of providing
such a transcript may be heavy, however, and the
trial court would be justified in taking this factor
into account if such relief is requested.8' If the
facilities of the court reporting system in a par-
ticular jurisdiction are not adequate to allow the
providing of daily copy, then, of course, no such
assistance is "possible" within the Brennan dictum.
The use of closed circuit television or radio
facilities is also "technologically possible," but
that again is a different question than whether it
is "possible in the circumstances." The expense of
such facilities are an important consideration,
particularly in. small or rural counties where the
court's budget may already be inadequate for
minimally required services and facilities. And it
should be emphasized, in connection with the
decision as to whether such an expense is justified,
that the facility is being sought not by a defendant
who is trying to enforce a right, but by one who
has forfeited a right by his contemptuous dis-
regard for the order and decorum inherent in the
judicial processP
The notion was quickly advanced by some mem-
bers of the defense bar that the Allen opinion does
not purport to deal with the defendant whose
unruly conduct is "provoked" by rulings of the
trial court to which he takes exception.p
81 This situation is clearly different from those in
which an indigent defendant is entitled to a free copy
of transcript for the purposes of impeachment, appeal
or collateral proceedings. In these cases, the cost to
the government canno t be taken into account, except,
perhaps, if less expensive means to enable the indigent
defendant to proceed as adequately as the affluent
defendant are available. See Roberts v. LaVallee, 389
U.S. 40 (1967); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487
(1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
82The suggestion that glass, sound-proof booths
should be installed in the courtroom to enable the
unruly defendant to see and hear the trial, but not to
be heard himself, should be rejected. Such an installa-
tion is an affront to the dignity of the American court-
room. The spectacle it would afford is little different
from the spectacle of the bound and gagged defendant,
characterized by the Court as "in affront to the very
dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the
judge is seeking to uphold." And the use of such a
technique would present the very same problems of
distraction of the jury who would constantly be con-
fronted not only with the sight of the defendant
(imagine Marcel Marceau in a glass booth), but also
his cage.
u See e.g., the remarks of attorney William Kunstler,
counsel for Bobby Seale at the "Conspiracy 7" trial, in
Chicago, supra note 62:
"My position is that I don't think the case appli-
cable to any of the contempt situations growing
This notion, of course, is specious. As a matter
of fact such a defense was advanced by Allen in
justification of his conduct at the trial. Following
early pre-trial skirmishes with the judge over
Allen's dissatisfaction with the denial of an ap-
pointment of counsel from a list he had prepared,"'
Allen became his own counsel and began ques-
tioning prospective jurors on voir dire examination.
When the questions ranged far afield from those
ordinarily deemed permissible,"8 the trial judge
ruled that:
"You've asked a lot of immaterial questions, which
were personal, which I don't think the juror should
be called upon to answer, and you will confine
youself solely to questions relating to their quali-
fications as jurors...."
It was in response to this ruling, and to the
judge's refusal to allow Allen to intertwine his
questions with assertions about his treatment by
the court and counsel, that Allen was "provoked"
into a violent demonstration which included a
threat to the life of the judge, the destruction of
his attorney's file, and his outbursts to the poten-
tial jurors. He was thereupon removed from the
courtroom.
More fundamentally, however, there is no war-
rant in our law or in the entire scope of our con-
out of the Chicago trial or to the Panther case
[in New York City]...." In each trial, Kuntsler
said, 'the provocation was based on the asserted
claim of violation of a constitutional right.' 'In
Chicago,' Kuntsler said, 'Bobby Seale... was
attempting to continue his defense of himself when
the judge ruled he couldn't. The others were pro-
testing the Seale treatment and objecting to other
things the judge was doing.' The New York
Panthers were protesting denial of reasonable bail,
Kuntsler said. Each situation, he said, 'was diff-
erent-totaly different-from ... Allen, who was
irrational' ".
Chicago Daily News, April 1, 1970 at 3, Col. 1-3.
Richard Moore, a defendant in the New York
Black Panther trial, said that "he and the other 12
Panther defendants would continue 'to speak out when
our constitutional rights are violated' ", New York
Daily News, April 1, 1970, at 3, Col. 4.
But see, the comment of H. Reed Harris, a Chicago
attorney who represented Allen in the Supreme Court,
that the decision "deprived the people of a fundamental
right to protest any irregularity that may take place
in the courtroom" Chicago Daily News, April 1, 1970,
at 1, Col. 4, and at 4, Col. 6.
4Including William Scott Stewart, Adlai Steven-
son, Jerry Giesler and Earle Stanley Gardner.
85 "Did the State's Attorney try to bribe you, or
anything?"; "Do you use narcotics?"; 'How much do
you drink?"; "Why didn't they take you in the army?";
"Do you have a garden in your yard, around your
house?"; "Is [your car] paid for?".
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stitutionally ordered judicial history for the "ap-
peal by violence and disruption" which this view
advances. Decisions of the Supreme Court 6 and
legislative reforms ensure that all defendants will
be represented by counsel at trial and that all will
have equal access to appellate courts for the
review of alleged trial errors. It simply goes against
the grain of our entire system to even contemplate
the idea that a litigant may respond to a judicial
ruling which he views as unfavorable by unleashing
pandemonium in the courtroom. Edmund Burke's
famous dictum was meant for the court of public
opin:on and not for the court of law."
There is no doubt that the defense of "provoca-
tion" was firmly rejected by the majority of the
Court who wrote in Allen. Speaking for six Justices,
Mr. Justice Black said:
"Being manned by humans, the courts are not
perfect and are bound to make some errors. But,
if our courts are to remain what the Founders in-
tended, the citadels of justice, their proceedings
cannot and must not be infected with the sort of
scurrilous, abusive language and conduct paraded
before the Illinois trial judge in this case." 8s
Concurring, Mr. Justice Brennan said:
"It [the nation] cannot endure if in individual cases
the claims of social peace and order on the one side
and of personal liberty on the other cannot be
mututally resolved in the forum designated by the
Constitution. If that resolution cannot be reached
by judicial trial in a court of law, it will be reached
elsewhere and by other means, and there will be
grave danger that liberty, equality, and the order
essential to both will be lost.
"The constitutional right of an accused to be
present at his trial must be considered in this
context. Thus there can be no doubt whatever that
6E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
8 Edmund Burke, Speech, Powers of Juries in
Prosecution for Libel: 'I like a clamor whenever there
is an abuse. The fireball at midnight disturbs your
sleep, but it keeps you from being burned in your
bed."
s 397 U.S. at 346-47.
the governmental prerogative to proceed with a
trial may not be defeated by conduct of the ac-
cused that prevents the trial from going forward.
... The Constitution would protect none of us if
it prevented the courts from acting to preserve
the very processes which the Constitution itself
prescribes." 
89
Those who sanction disruptive conduct in the
courtroom do grave disservice, not only to the
causes of their clients and to their fellow mem-
bers of the bar, but also to the American public,
whose respect for and belief in the judicial system
constitutes the only foundation upon which the
system may survive.
19 Id. at 348 (Brennan, J., concurring). In a separate
concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas asked:
"Would we tolerate removal of a defendant from
the courtroom because he was insisting on his
constitutional rights, albeit vociferously, no matter
how obnoxious his philosophy might have been to
the bench that tried him? Would we uphold con-
tempt in that situation?"
397 U.S. at 355 (Douglas, J., concurring).
There is at least some doubt that even this state-
ment endorses the notion that defendants reacting to
"constitutional error" are entitled to do so by dis-rupting the trial. First, the comment was directed at
"political trials", "political indictments" and "politi-
cal judges", which were not further defined. Secondly,
Mr. Justice Douglas distinguished what he called
"trials used by minorities to destroy the existing con-
stitutional system and bring on repressive measures."
As to such cases, he said:
"The Constitution was not designed as an instrument
for that form of rough and tumble contest. The
social compact has room for tolerance, patience,
and restraint but not for sabotage and violence.
Trials involving that spectacle strike at the very
heart of constitutional government."
Id. at 356. Thirdly, there is some question as to whether
justice Douglas would equate the tactics by Allen, and
defended by those approving of their use in current
trials, with "vociferous insistence" on constitutional
rights. For he prefaced his opinion with the observa-
tion that:
"I agree with the Court that a criminal trial, in
the constitutional sense, cannot take place where
the courtroom is a bedlam and either the accused
or the judge is hurling epithets at the other. A
courtroom is a hallowed placed where trials must
proceed with dignity.. .. "
Id at 351. In any event, Justice Douglas' observation
offers small comfort to the advocates of the "provoca-
tion" theory in light of its explicit rejection by the
seven Justice majority in Alen.
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